

Page 6 01

***Are military teams used for DOE force-on-force exercises? If not, when are military teams used and why?***

Military teams are used for some DOE force-on-force exercises. The decision to use military teams has depended on a number of factors. For example, since the beginning of 1998, OA has used military teams for eight force-on-force tests (out of a total of 22). The OA use of military teams (Navy SEALs and Army Rangers) was confined to the year 1998 and reflected a set of special circumstances. For a period of several years in the mid-1990s, force-on-force testing at DOE facilities was suspended as a result of safety concerns arising from a fatality during a force-on-force exercise conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Although some DOE organizations resumed testing earlier, OA delayed resumption until the beginning of 1998 in order to assure that all potential safety issues had been thoroughly addressed. This meant that the OA-sponsored DOE Composite Adversary Team (CAT), consisting of specially selected protective force personnel from the various DOE sites, had to be re-constituted.

After reviewing the status of the CAT program as it existed following the lengthy suspension of testing, OA determined that a significant period of personnel screening and training would be required before the CAT would achieve the level of tactical capability required to support effective performance testing. As an interim measure, OA negotiated with elements of the DOD special warfare community for support in this area. Under this agreement, a team of Navy SEALs was employed during the OA inspection of the Rocky Flats site in the spring of 1998. In the fall of 1998 OA employed a team of Army Rangers during its inspection of the Office of Transportation Safeguards. During this same period, OA relied upon some of these same military assets to assist in developing a training program that would ensure the effectiveness of the renewed CAT program. The new CAT was employed for the first time during an inspection of Los Alamos National Laboratory in the fall of 1998. Since that time, OA has relied upon the CAT as its force-on-force adversary element. (It should be noted that CAT personnel, although drawn from DOE protective forces, include personnel with military special operations backgrounds.)

OA believes that, having overcome the negative effects of the mid-1990s testing hiatus, the CAT represents the best all-around capability for its force-on-force testing purposes. There are several reasons for this. First, the reliance upon first line military special operations assets posed significant planning and scheduling problems. These same personnel, of course, are expected to be capable of rapid deployment overseas in support of a variety of national security missions. OA quickly discovered that months of planning and preparation for an inspection could be irreparably damaged overnight by an international incident. Second, although the military personnel involved derived some benefit from the experience of planning and executing simulated attacks upon DOE facilities, the necessity of training and preparing for a broad-range of world-wide contingencies meant that these personnel could not concentrate upon developing and maintaining particular skills necessary in the highly specialized environment of a DOE nuclear site. Once the CAT had been re-established with an appropriate ongoing training program based on current military special operations doctrine, the familiarity of CAT members with the DOE tactical environment proved to be beneficial. Members of the CAT may not be uniformly capable of HALO parachute insertion or of operating underwater (although some members have skills of this type), but they know DOE and its protective forces and they routinely use this knowledge to place the protective forces at a disadvantage.

We do not, of course, take the position that the OA CAT personnel are the equals of military special operations personnel across all of the disciplines required by the latter to perform their various missions. We are, however, fully satisfied that the CAT provides an accurate representation of the tactical capabilities attributed to terrorist groups in the current DOE Design Basis Threat, which is the policy foundation for testing DOE protection capabilities.

In addition to the OA experience, DOE has also made use of military personnel to support other types of force-on-force performance testing. The DOE Office of Security (SO) has a long-standing arrangement with DOD that provides access to designated military special operations personnel for performance testing and related purposes. These personnel have been used in performance tests sponsored by SO and by the various DOE line management organizations, for purposes ranging from the verification and validation of SSSPs to the conduct of safeguards and security surveys and other line management performance reviews. The Office of Transportation Safeguards has made particular use of these personnel, both as adversaries and also as evaluators of training exercises. The use of these personnel by the various line management organizations varies. Since their availability is limited (they also perform work for the NRC and other agencies, as well as fulfilling their ongoing DOD responsibilities), they tend to be employed on a selective basis by the various line management organizations. These personnel are not used by OA because their frequent use by line management for exercises associated with the development of security plans represents a conflict of interest with respect to the independent oversight function, one of whose major roles is to inspect these plans.

## **FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY**

### **PAGES 7-8**

**1) During a 1997 force-on-force exercise at Technical Area 18 at LANL, the mock "terrorists" were able to steal enough weapons-grade uranium for numerous nuclear weapons, and carried the material away with a Home Depot garden cart. The DOE security personnel reportedly later argued that the use of a garden cart was unfair.**

**b) Could this weapons grade uranium have been used as a homemade nuclear bomb (ie improvised nuclear device) with a nuclear yield onsite or offsite? How long would it have taken to construct and detonate such a device?**

**Answer:** The use of weapons grade uranium has always been a key component in nuclear weapons design. The Department has extensive protection measures in place to mitigate against the remote possibility that a terrorist organization could construct or detonate a device. Following the terror attack of September 11, 2001, NNSA undertook a comprehensive review of security and implemented additional protective force measures across the complex to further safeguard materials.

**c) What would the consequences have been to the Los Alamos area if this material had been dispersed using conventional explosives, i.e. a dirty bomb?**

**Answer:** In the unlikely event that a terrorist organization could construct and detonate a dirty bomb, the environmental consequences to the Los Alamos area would require a massive and sustained cleanup effort.

Page 7 - 28

*(In addition to the October, 2000 OA force-on-force at Los Alamos) how many other DOE force-on-force exercises have had the mock terrorists use chemical agents? What were the results of each such exercise?*

After resolving the safety concerns arising from the fatal accident at Los Alamos, DOE resumed force-on-force performance testing in 1997. This coincided with significant changes in national and Departmental policy regarding the potential terrorist use of lethal chemical and biological agents. Although DOE had previously required chemical masks for protective force personnel, these masks were only designed to protect against tear gas. During the period 1998-1999, DOE worked with the DOD chemical warfare experts to try and determine an appropriate policy for protection and lethal agents and to identify suitable protective masks and other gear to procure on a Department-wide basis for issue to protective force personnel. Procurement decisions were made and acquisitions began early in 2000, followed shortly at most sites by training in the use of the new masks and related equipment.

During this transitional period, the focus of line management was upon the process that led from the decision to acquire new masks to the placement of the masks in the hands of the troops. The corresponding focus of OA inspection activities was one of monitoring this process from a management perspective. For example, the OA inspection at Pantex in early 2000 made an issue of the fact that not all protective force tactical responders had received masks and appropriate training in their use. Having raised this issue to the appropriate level, however, there was no value in including simulated gas attacks in the force-on-force performance tests, since it was clear that, at that time, Pantex was not fully prepared to deal with such a tactic (shortly after the inspection Pantex completed the process of mask issue and training).

At the same time, OA began preparations for including simulated gas attacks in its force-on-force tests. During the annual CAT training program in spring of 2000, simulation protocols were developed and tested during several rounds of force-on-force training exercises conducted between the CAT and the Nevada Test Site protective force. With the completion of this essential stage, OA used simulated gas during its next force-on-force inspection, at Los Alamos in October 2000. This represented the first such use in a major DOE performance test. Since that time OA also used simulated gas in the next inspection that involved force-on-force performance testing, at Savannah River in 2001. Following the OA lead, line management organizations have begun to incorporate simulated chemical attacks in their force-on-force tests and in other limited scope performance tests.

In total, OA has simulated the terrorist use of chemical agents in three of the six force-on-force performance tests conducted since the Department-wide issue of chemical protective equipment, for a 50% ratio. The protective force performed well in two of these three tests, and the problems that surfaced in the third test have been addressed through additional training.

It should be noted that the decision to *not* use simulated chemical agents in some tests in no way reflects a lack of rigor in the test program. Chemical agents are inherently difficult for the adversary to use, since their use also forces the adversary to operate in the same hazardous environment, using the same protective equipment. In some scenarios, the use of chemical agents represents a handicap to the adversary, rather than an advantage. OA introduces simulated chemical agents into its force-on-force scenarios in those situations only when their use provides maximum advantage to the adversary and corresponding maximum stress on the protective force.

## **SECTION: Force-on-Force Exercises at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)**

**Page 7, Question 2:** In October, 2000, once again during a force-on-force drill at Technical Area 18 at LANL, the mock "terrorists" were successful in penetrating the facility security during a force-on-force exercise and were able to gain control of sensitive nuclear materials which, if detonated, could have endangered significant parts of New Mexico and Colorado. Apparently, according to a December 20, 2000 memo from DOE Special Assistant Peter Stockton to then-DOE Secretary Bill Richardson, officials at LANL claimed that it was unfair that the mock "terrorists" used a commercially available gaseous irritant to help disorient the security forces and gain access to the nuclear materials.

**2c:** How will you ensure that security forces at DOE facilities are prepared to withstand attacks using gaseous irritants in the future?

**Answer:** According to OSHA Standard, 29CFR1910.134 paragraph (k), it is a DOE employer responsibility to provide respiratory protection for its employees. The CFR, "requires the employer to provide effective training to employees who are required to use respirators. The training must be comprehensive, understandable, and recur annually, and more often if necessary."

Since its inception in 1999, students in the Basic Security Police Officer Training course (conducted by the DOE Safeguards and Security Central Training Academy) are given approximately 5.5 hours of DOE standardized Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) equipment training. Since 1987, the Security Police Officer III course incorporates the CBW respirator (chemical protective mask) into approximately 10 hours of training. This training utilizes the respirator in the weapons qualification phase and in the live-fire shoot house scenarios.

Regarding the availability of CBW equipment for DOE protective force personnel, the following CBW equipment was issued to all DOE protective forces in late 2000: respirators, canisters, full CBW suits (boots, gloves, hood, pants, and jacket), battery chargers, and respirator packs.

2) In October, 2000, once again during a force-on-force drill at Technical Area 18 at LANL, the mock "terrorists" were successful in penetrating the facility security during a force-on-force exercise and were able to gain control of sensitive nuclear materials which, if detonated, could have endangered significant parts of New Mexico and Colorado. Apparently, according a December 20, 2000 memo from DOE Special Assistant Peter Stockton to then DOE Secretary Bill Richardson, officials at LANL claimed that it was unfair that the mock "terrorists" used a commercially available gaseous irritant to help disorient the security forces and gain access to the nuclear materials.

This force-on-force exercise resulted in mock terrorists gaining access to the facility as well as the nuclear materials located within the facility. There have been reports of Al Qaeda's attempts to make nuclear weapons, which include improvised nuclear devices, or "homemade nuclear bombs" rough fission weapons are hastily assembled and detonated to produce nuclear yield, and radiological dispersion devices, or dirty bombs in which conventional explosives are used to detonate and disperse radioactive material throughout a large area.

d) Do you agree that had the mock attack that took place at LANL in October 2000 been a real attack, either one of these devices could have been hastily constructed and detonated? If not, why not, given that it is clear from the events of September 11 and the discovery of terrorist training manuals in Al Qaeda safe houses that terrorists undertaking these attacks might well possess the knowledge necessary to construct such weapons?

**Answer:** The Department has extensive protection measures in place to mitigate against the remote possibility that a terrorist organization could construct or detonate a device. Following the terror attack of September 11, 2001, NNSA undertook a comprehensive review of security and implemented additional protective force measures across the complex to further safeguard materials. Further discussion regarding the use of improvised nuclear devices is classified.

Page 8 - 2E

*(With regard to the October, 2000 force-on-force test at Los Alamos) Do you have any confidence that guard forces that had suffered such extraordinary losses could have been reconstituted and have taken successful offensive actions to kill the terrorists or remove them from the facility? If so, please fully explain in detail.*

Although an erroneous controller call resulted in the premature termination of the exercise, it is the unanimous opinion of the OA inspectors charged with evaluating the exercise results that the protective force could *not* have reconstituted itself in a manner to permit a timely recapture of the facility. There were two main reasons for this conclusion. In addition to the significant number of casualties referred to in the question, the surviving protective force members were too widely scattered to quickly reform and enter the facility. The concerns mentioned in the question were discussed in the inspection report that covered this test, and these concerns were communicated forcefully by OA managers to the appropriate line organizations in a series of "closed door" meetings following the inspection. As a result, the NNSA Administrator mandated a series of immediate compensatory measures, which were reviewed on the ground by OA and found to be responsive to the particular problems highlighted during the test. Since that time, Los Alamos has followed these immediate compensatory measures with a broader scheme of corrective actions to deal with these problems.

Page 8-2F

*DOE requires all protective forces to have recapture capabilities to address the very situation described above. How many recapture performance tests or force-on-force exercises have been conducted in the past 12 months? What were the results of each such test or exercise?*

OA has conducted four force-on-force performance tests during the past 12 months. Each test was designed to test the full sequence of protective force response actions, including recapture, *as an ongoing set of actions*. That is, the protective force was expected to deny the adversary access to the target material. In the event that denial failed, the protective force was expected to contain the adversary at the target location and then mount an effective recapture assault. In three of the four tests, the adversary was prevented from gaining control of the material in the first place; in the fourth test, the adversaries gained control of the material and immediately attempted to evade the protective force by leaving the target location. They were "killed" by the protective force during this attempt. Thus, although recapture was a potential test activity, it was not formally tested because the protective force successfully neutralized the adversaries before recapture was required. OA plans to test recapture on a more routine basis during its 2002 cycle of performance tests. It will add a "recapture" limited scope test, where necessary, even in cases where the protective force has already successfully demonstrated a denial response, and it will also expand its program of "tabletop" reviews of recapture/recover capabilities.



**SECTION: Force-on-Force Exercises at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)**

This force-on-force exercise resulted in the mock "terrorists" gaining access to the facility as well as to nuclear materials located within the facility. There have been reports of Al Qaeda's attempts to make nuclear weapons, which include improvised nuclear devices, or "homemade nuclear bombs," in which rough fission weapons are hastily assembled and detonated to produce nuclear yield, and radiological dispersion devices, or "dirty bombs," in which conventional explosives are used to detonate and disperse radioactive material throughout a large area.

**Page 8, Question 2g:** In the event that a terrorist attack took place at a DOE facility and resulted in the terrorists gaining access to the facility, what would DOE security forces be required to do? Would they be expected to reenter the facility and attempt to re-take it, even if the security forces had already suffered significant losses of personnel? How long would this be expected to take? If not, what other resources could be utilized to respond to the security breach?

**Answer:** Should denial and or containment fail, then recapture/recovery or pursuit strategy would then be required. Special Response Teams consisting of highly trained Security Police Officers Level III are used for recapture operations. Facilities are required to have Memoranda of Understanding with Local Law Enforcement Agencies for support.

Page 8 - 2X

***Have mock "terrorists" ever locked themselves inside a vault during a force-on-force exercise? If so, what were the circumstances, and what has been done to ensure that this would not be possible in the future? Has every DOE facility been tested to ensure that this cannot occur? Are the guard forces given the equipment they would need to re-open the vault doors quickly?***

Mock "terrorists" have not succeeded in locking themselves inside a vault during any of the 22 OA force-on-force performance tests reviewed as representative of DOE performance testing. In most instances involving an attack by an outside terrorist group, this is a less than credible scenario, since the fact that adversaries are usually required to use explosive breaching to penetrate a vault means that they would leave an irreparable hole for the protective force to use to re-enter the vault or (more profitably) interrupt the adversaries activities inside by directing automatic weapons fire through the hole. Nonetheless, DOE has recognized the need to make sure that protective forces have appropriate re-entry capability at all locations where such a capability is required by the nature of the material being protected, and has made an ongoing effort to ensure that such capabilities have been implemented. Because knowledge of such special re-entry facilities or devices might also be of benefit to an adversary, such details are classified in accordance with the nature of the material being protected.

## **Page 9**

**The December 20, 2000 memo from DOE Special Assistant Peter Stockton to then-DOE Secretary Bill Richardson indicated that in April 2000, a decision was made to relocate the facility and materials so as to increase security while reducing costs. An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was to have been completed by December 15, 2000 and a final decision to be made by January 15, 2001.**

### **n) When was the EIS completed? What did it say?**

**Answer:** The Final EIS for the proposed relocation of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area (TA)-18 missions is almost complete, and is currently undergoing final internal reviews. NNSA expects to publish the document in Spring 2002.

The Draft EIS was published in August 2001. The Draft EIS analyzes several alternatives for continuing the missions housed at TA-18 into the future. Alternatives for Security Category I activities are:

- No Action (required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)),
- Upgrade TA-18,
- Build a new, underground facility adjacent to TA-55 at LANL (the preferred alternative),
- Modify and build new facilities at Sandia National Laboratory-Albuquerque at TA-V,
- Modify and build new facilities at Nevada Test Site's Device Assembly Facility, and
- Modify multiple facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West.

The remaining support activities alternatives are remaining at LANL/TA-18 or building new facilities adjacent to LANL/TA-55.

The results of the Draft EIS indicate minor environmental impacts from construction activities, transportation activities, and routine operations. Depending on the alternatives, there are varying levels of environmental impacts from non-routine events driven by natural phenomenon or other external events such as an aircraft crash or unplanned criticality.

### **o) Has a final decision been made on relocating this facility? If so, what was it? If not, why not, and when will the final decision be made?**

**Answer:** Since the NEPA process is not yet complete, NNSA has not made a final decision on relocating TA-18 missions. A number of factors contributed to the decision delay.

The EIS took longer than initially anticipated due to the technical complexity of the missions and the number of alternatives analyzed. Initial feasibility studies were prepared to fully understand the construction, operation, and transportation activities required for each alternative, and were completed in Spring 2001.

Additionally, NNSA experienced uncontrollable delays in the steps required under NEPA. First, the public scoping period meeting for Los Alamos planned for May 2000 was delayed a few weeks due to the Cerro Grande Fire that swept through LANL and the surrounding areas. Second, the public meetings on the draft EIS, originally scheduled to begin on September 11, 2001, were delayed for approximately four weeks due to the terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the public comment period on the Draft EIS was also extended from October 4, 2001 to October 25, 2001 to provide interested parties opportunity to comment after participating in a public meeting. Finally, U.S. mail service was suspended at NNSA during the final week of the comment period, delaying completion of the comment response document until mid December 2001 when mail service was restored.

NNSA is conducting internal reviews of the Final EIS. Once these reviews are complete, NNSA will issue the Final EIS with a Record of Decision following the mandatory waiting period of 30 days. Currently, NNSA expects to complete these reviews in the Spring of 2002.

Page 9

(U) A May 30, 2000, DOE Inspector General (IG) report found numerous problems in the oversight of security at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

Question: 3.a) (U) The IG report concluded that the Albuquerque Operations Office of DOE changed LANL's security ratings for 1998 and 1999 "without providing a documented rationale for the changes." Albuquerque DOE management concurred with this conclusion. Please identify the personnel who changed the security ratings. Do you believe it was appropriate for them to take this action, since there was apparently no documented rationale for the change? What performance evaluations or performance ratings did the personnel who changed the security ratings receive for their work during this period? What have you done DOE-wide to ensure that the 2000 and 2001 security ratings were made appropriately?

Answer: (U) Individual(s) responsible for changing ratings from 1998 and 1999 AL surveys of LANL were:

David Frederickson, Director, Safeguards and Security Division

Richard W. Phillips, Deputy Director, Safeguards and Security Division

Larry Kirkman, Assistant Manager, Office of Safety and Security.

(U) It was appropriate for management personnel to exercise their judgment. The position of DOE Headquarters and Albuquerque Operations (AL) management at the time of the 1998 and 1999 LANL surveys was that the survey team made recommendations for ratings to be assigned for each subtopic/topic; a rating was not assigned until management determined the rating based on input from the survey team. The survey team performed a "snap-shot" review; management had an ongoing association with LANL, which provided a broader perspective of security issues. At the time of the 1998 and 1999 surveys, LANL had many security issues and ongoing initiatives to address these issues. AL management was actively involved with LANL's resolution of security anomalies throughout 1998 and 1999. Management, therefore, had a more in-depth, continuous awareness of LANL's deficiencies and the efforts undertaken to correct them. The ratings ultimately assigned to LANL were based on management's experience, knowledge, and heavy involvement with the laboratory's safeguards and security program.

(U) All three individuals received "Satisfactory" ratings in their performance evaluations.

(U) At Albuquerque Operations, a new process has been implemented to record any changes to ratings determined by the Team Lead, Murder Board, management, and final report. Rationale for these changes is to be documented. Additionally, on January 18, 2001, the Office of Security issued DOE-wide policy requiring all IG findings and recommendations to be entered into the Safeguards and Security Information Management System for tracking to closure.

Page 9

Question: 3.b) (U) The DOE IG report concluded that the Albuquerque Operations Office of DOE "did not fully address concerns about a compromise of force-on-force exercise during the 1998 Albuquerque Security Survey at LANL." Albuquerque DOE management concurred with this conclusion. What have you done to ensure that these concerns have been satisfactorily resolved? What have you done DOE-wide to ensure that in the future, such concerns are addressed immediately after they occur?

Answer: (U) Regarding the alleged compromise of the exercise, LANL maintains the allegations that the trusted agent divulged information are false. They stand by their performance testing process and reject any allegation that they "game" the system or otherwise cheat to get good results. Over the past two years, they have carried out an increased level of force-on-force testing. They engage in this level of activity for two purposes: 1) to ensure they have the best-trained security force possible and, 2) to validate security-planning factors. When they have an unsuccessful exercise, they approach the problem methodically and analyze every aspect of the activity, with the goal of correcting the problem.

(U) A debriefing is held following every force-on-force exercise. Concerns are addressed at that time. Additionally, on January 18, 2001, the Office of Security issued DOE-wide policy requiring all IG findings and recommendations to be entered into the Safeguards and Security Information Management System for tracking to closure.

Question: 3.c) (U) The DOE IG report concluded that documentation related to the 1997 and 1998 Security Surveys were destroyed (counter to DOE policy). Albuquerque DOE management concurred with this conclusion. Why were these documents destroyed? If this destruction of documentation was improper and contrary to DOE policies and procedures, were any of the individuals who directed or carried out the destruction of the documents disciplined? If not, why not? What performance ratings or performance evaluations did such individuals receive for their work during this period? Were any of these individuals the same individuals who changed the 1998 and 1999 security ratings? If so, have you determined whether the individuals destroyed the documents in order to cover up the fact that they had improperly altered the security ratings? What have you done to ensure that in the future, all DOE security personnel are aware of and comply with DOE policy on preserving documentation?

Answer: (U) The working papers from the 1997 security survey were destroyed in accordance with the locally-approved Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) Security Survey Procedural Guide (May 1997), which states "Working papers will be maintained until completion of the next periodic survey." Additionally, the Safeguards and Security Survey and Self-Assessment Guide, DOE G 470.1-1, dated March 15, 1996, states "...At the end of the survey, all working papers should be turned over the to Team Leader for retention, generally at least until completion of the next survey at the facility."

(U) The working papers from the 1998 security survey were not destroyed, and are still maintained in the Safeguards and Physical Security Division.

(U) The same individuals (Dave Frederickson, Richard W. Phillips and Larry Kirkman) from Albuquerque Operations led the 1997 and 1998 surveys. All three individuals received "Satisfactory" ratings in their Performance evaluations.

(U) The documents were not destroyed "to cover up the fact that they had improperly altered the security ratings," as referred to in the Representative Markey letter. Although guidance from both the DOE Headquarters and AL Operations Office was followed, SPSD management directed that procedures be established to ensure working papers from safeguards and security surveys are maintained in accordance with the Department of Energy Retention Schedule. These procedures currently are being followed.

Page 10

Question: 3.d) (U) The DOE IG report concluded that about 30% of LANL Security Operations Division personnel reported that they felt pressured to alter their security self-assessments grades. According to the report, "several of these individuals said LANL management appeared to be more concerned about making LANL and the Security Operations Division "look good" than reporting the actual security condition at LANL" Albuquerque DOE management concurred with this conclusion. What have you done to identify the individuals responsible for applying this pressure and take appropriate disciplinary action against them? What performance evaluations or performance ratings did such individuals receive for their work during this period? What have you done to ensure that DOE security personnel are free to do their job without inappropriate pressure in the future? If no steps have been taken, why not?

Answer: (U) As to those involved in the LANL assessment program who may have felt what they believed to be pressure to modify assessment reports, the Security Operations Division follows standard assessment methodologies that, by design, include a review and validation process to ensure findings are based upon actual requirements and substantiated conditions. Surveys, in fact, conform to the process that DOE itself uses in conducting inspections. There is ambiguity in DOE orders regarding the self-assessment process, with room for interpretation differences amongst all of the involved parties. These differences arise out of various views on the nature or cause of a particular problem, and differences of opinion on the corrective actions needed. Ensuring assessment reports are accurate and valid is in fact a large part of the internal process. The result that some people may interpret this as interference or manipulation is unfortunate. The goal in this process is to bring people together and arrive at a mutually agreed upon summation of the problems and corrective actions, while being open in self-reporting, accurate in findings, and fair in assignment of responsibility. Therefore, as to the question of making changes to assessment reports and modifying findings -- this is the DOE approved approach to conducting assessments. This in no way constitutes a process being used to cover up findings and make management "look good". Given that the approved DOE process was used, it was not necessary to identify individuals "responsible for applying this pressure." See Page 11., D, "Review of Safeguards and Security Self-Assessments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory" regarding LANL's Self-



Assessment Program.

Page 10

Question: 3.e) (U) The Albuquerque DOE management stated that they would take corrective action in response to the problems identified in the DOE IG report. What corrective action has been taken? Have they implemented all the specific recommendations made in the DOE IG report? If not, why not? What have you done to ensure that the actions taken solve the problems that were identified?

Answer: (U) Although all corrective actions have not been completed, plans have been developed. Additionally, the self-assessment reviews recommended by the IG for DOE facilities, including LANL, have been conducted. The status of these corrective actions is available through the Safeguards and Security Information Management Systems (SSIMS)..

Page 10

Question: 3.f) (U) The DOE IG report recommended that the DOE review security operations at other DOE facilities. Has this happened? If so, please provide a copy of the review. If not, why not?

Answer: (U) The review recommended by the IG was conducted (please see the attached report dated October 2000). As requested by the IG, the Office of Security and Emergency Operations (SO-1) evaluated self-assessment programs at other DOE facilities. The Director of SO-1 requested assistance from Defense Programs (DP-1) on April 12, 2000, for a review to be limited to self-assessment programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

(U) In summary, the review team concluded that all sites reviewed by the team had fully implemented the self-assessment program with the exception of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia). The self-assessment for Sandia's Tonopah Test Range facility had not been fully completed at the time of the review. Additionally, there was no evidence of effective oversight of self-assessments at satellite and subcontractor facilities. It should be noted that Sandia's own program noted some of the program deficiencies and that they have embarked

upon a series of corrective actions. See: Report of Review of Safeguards and Security Self-Assessments at Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

Page 10

Question: 3.h) (U) Were these security deficiencies entered into the Safeguards and Security Information Management System as required? If not, why not? Were corrective action plans developed within 30 days as required? If not, why not?

Answer: (U) The deficiencies were entered into Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS) upon receipt of the final IG report; Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) were developed within 30 days, and the CAPs were also entered into SIMMS.

**SECTION: Force-on-Force Exercises at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)**

**Page 10, Question 3:** A May 30, 2000 DOE Inspector General (IG) report found numerous problems in the oversight of security at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

**3f:** The DOE IG report recommended that the DOE review security operations at other DOE facilities. Has this happened? If so, please provide a copy of the review. If not, why not?

**Answer:** A joint Security Affairs/Defense Programs (DP) team led by DP conducted reviews at the following sites: Sandia New Mexico, Sandia California, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The review resulted in the preparation of a report entitled "Review of Safeguards and Security Self-Assessments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory" dated October 2000. A copy is attached.

Page 10, Question #3g): The DOE IG report concluded that if the 1998 grades had not been changed, LANL security would have been rated "unsatisfactory" overall. Please indicate the total performance award fee given to the University of California for management and operation of LANL in 1998, as well as the maximum amount that could have been deducted from this fee had the security ratings not been improperly changed.

LANL was awarded a total of \$7.65 million in performance award fee for FY 1998. Had LANL's performance in Safeguards and Security been rated as less than "Good" (which would be below a score of 70%,) their award fee would have been reduced by \$245,000, for a new total of \$7.4 million..